On Monday, November 16, 2026, visitors of major brands' websites (BBC, CNN, Zoom, HSBC, Salesforce) received malicious code, without those sites having been hacked. The code came from a third-party script they trust: Optimizely, a service that lets companies test variants of web pages.
The site was not hacked: the third-party tool it trusted was.
What happened
According to Optimizely, an unauthorized party exploited a flaw in its experimentation service and added malicious code to some customers' projects. The code sat in the "Project JavaScript" field and was served from Optimizely's own network, with a valid certificate: browsers trusted it. Researcher Scott Helme (Report URI) checked 1,611 scripts and found 188 infected, belonging to at least 178 organizations.
According to The Hacker News, quoting Report URI and StepSecurity, the first injection was at 04:21 UTC on Monday, the card skimmer was added at 13:43 UTC, the iPhone exploit was in place between 17:13 and 17:57 UTC, and cleanup began around 20:40 UTC. Optimizely published its notice overnight, at 01:02 UTC on Tuesday, November 17.
What the code did
- Cryptocurrency: it replaced wallet addresses with the attacker's. About $7,000 reached the attacker's wallets ($7,040 according to Report URI, $6,600 according to StepSecurity, $7,150 according to Help Net Security).
- Bank cards: it copied the number, expiry date and security code typed into the site's own forms. Fields supplied by a separate payment provider, opened in a separate frame, were out of reach. How many cards were copied remains unknown.
- iPhone and iPad: for devices running iOS 18.6 or older, it opened exploit kits (Coruna for iOS 13 to 17, DarkSword for iOS 18). No actual takeover of a device is confirmed to date.
Who is affected, and why the region is concerned
At least 178 organizations, including 32 banks and financial firms, the largest group of victims according to Help Net Security. The figure is a minimum: researchers could only check the scripts they found in time. No organization from the region is named in the sources we read, which does not mean none is affected.
The risk does not depend on the country: it depends on loading a third-party script on your pages. Organizations that entrust their website, page tests or campaigns to an agency or an external service are particularly exposed, in the region as elsewhere, because they do not always see which scripts their pages load. The first question to ask your agency: which third-party tools are loaded on our payment and login pages?
Eight checks to make this week
For a bank, an online merchant or any organization that uses Optimizely or a similar tool, then for individuals:
- Search the "Project JavaScript" and the experiment code for the strings 1688360, atob(, .icu and track.js, reported by the researchers.
- Change the passwords, access tokens (API) and rights of all the users of the account, and turn on two-step sign-in.
- Remove every third-party script from payment pages, and have the card typed into a form hosted by the payment provider, in a separate frame.
- Set a strict content security policy. Allowing Optimizely's domain does not protect you: the code came from that domain.
- Review the logs since Monday, November 16 at 08:00 UTC (3 a.m. in Bogotá and Port-au-Prince, 5 a.m. in Brasília), looking for connections to the domains flagged by the researchers.
- Warn your customers if your payment pages loaded the script, and your national incident response team or your regulator according to your obligations.
- Individuals: update your iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later.
- Individuals: check your card statements and your cryptocurrency payments of Monday, November 16, and check the destination address on a hardware wallet's screen, not in copied text.
What the sources do not say, and where they differ
- 1,611 scripts checked, 188 infected, 178 organizations: several scripts may belong to one organization, the sources do not detail the gap.
- Among the 178 organizations, 24 had a content security policy strict enough to block the code, which is 13.5%; the source states 15%. 68 had none, and 50 had a policy that let the code through.
- Cryptocurrency losses: three close figures depending on the source, because they were read at different times. Card losses are unknown.
- Optimizely has not published the exact nature of the flaw, the number of projects changed or the exact time of the fix.
Where this note comes from: Trogon Atlas
This note is an alert: it takes public facts and reads them for the region. The observations measured by Trogon, country by country, are in our other articles. They feed Trogon Atlas, our cyber threat intelligence platform for Latin America and the Caribbean, currently in a pilot phase. Its MVP, the first version for organizations in the region, is being prepared.
Request early access to the Trogon Atlas pilot
Trogon Atlas tracks the cyber threats that affect Latin America and the Caribbean, in French and English. Pilot access is by invitation, for a small number of organizations. Two fields are enough: your name and email, and we will get back to you.