When people talk about cyber threats in the Caribbean, they think of attacks first. But much of the risk is quieter: devices — routers, embedded web servers, carrier boxes — that answer anyone on the internet. Our platform, Trogon Atlas, tracks this exposed surface by combining several sources: a census of reachable devices (Shodan), our own honeypot, a public list of addresses reported as malicious, the NVD vulnerability database and MaxMind geolocation. Here is a first look at what it shows for Haiti, compared with Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago and the Bahamas.
What we looked at
As of November 6, 2026, the census counts 31,277 services reachable from the internet in Haiti, against 127,665 in Jamaica, 259,367 in the Dominican Republic, 88,970 in Trinidad and Tobago and 28,090 in the Bahamas. A service is an address plus a port: a single device can expose several. In parallel, a fake SSH server — a honeypot, located in the Latin America and Caribbean region — that we have run since September 3 recorded 9,837 connections (one connection = one session opened on the decoy) from 3,292 distinct addresses.
Each country keeps its colour across all the charts. The figure under each country's name is the share of indexed services with at least one reported known vulnerability. Grey countries are not observed in this study.
Haiti stands out on known vulnerabilities
Among the services indexed in Haiti, 22.3% (6,968 out of 31,277) carry at least one reported known vulnerability, against 1.3% to 3.6% in the other four countries.
Services indexed on November 6, 2026. Each country's number of services is shown in brackets.
This is not a scattered problem. Three old flaws, listed in the NVD database between 2015 and 2019, each affect more than 4,100 services, about 60% of the country's vulnerable services. They hit versions of lighttpd earlier than 1.4.54, a lightweight web server common in embedded devices, which alone accounts for 5,705 services (18.2%). None is in the CISA catalog of vulnerabilities known to be exploited, and all are fixed in recent versions. That is rather good news: a single update instruction, or a single hardware replacement, would fix many of them at once.
Management services that should be closed
Beyond vulnerabilities, some management services should not answer the internet at all. Each country has its own profile (share of indexed services):
| Country | SNMP (monitoring) | TR-069 (carrier box management) | Telnet (unencrypted admin) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Haiti | |||
| Jamaica | |||
| Dominican Rep. | |||
| Trinidad & Tobago | |||
| Bahamas |
A management service that answers publicly is a possible way in; the longer the bar, the more frequent it is.
- Haiti: the SNMP monitoring protocol answers on 27.0% of services (8,458), against 2.3% to 7.4% elsewhere, and Telnet — an unencrypted administration protocol — on 0.9% (283 services), which is 2 to 11 times more, proportionally, than in the other four countries.
- Jamaica: the remote-management port of carrier boxes (TR-069) is reachable on 42.6% of services (54,337).
- Dominican Republic: TR-069 on 25.7% of services (66,652), and BGP — the exchange of routes between operators, which should not be reachable from the internet — on 11.2% (29,040 services).
- Trinidad and Tobago: the least exposed on SNMP (2.3%) and TR-069 (0.1%).
- Bahamas: TR-069 on 27.4% of services (7,702) and SNMP on 7.4% (2,087).
What the threat list says
Atlas also ingests a public list of addresses reported as malicious, IPinsights. The contrast is striking: 55 Haitian addresses appear in it, against 193 for Jamaica, 221 for Trinidad and Tobago and 1,029 for the Dominican Republic. Haiti therefore shows a lot of known vulnerabilities, but few addresses reported as a source of attacks. Two readings are possible and we cannot decide between them: fewer compromised devices attacking outward, or fewer sensors observing and reporting them. This list measures what is reported, not the real threat.
What the honeypot shows
Our honeypot is a single sensor, located somewhere in the Latin America and Caribbean region (we do not say where, as a precaution). It mostly sees automated scans from all over the world. Each week, roughly 350 to 420 distinct addresses knock on its door, with no clear trend over nine weeks.
Honeypot located in the Latin America and Caribbean region, September 3 to November 6, 2026. Hollow circles mark incomplete weeks (go-live on September 3; current week).
By distinct address — a more faithful measure than the number of events — the United States accounts for 22%, Argentina 13%, Ukraine 8% and Russia 4%. Out of 3,292 addresses, none is Haitian and two are Dominican.
Why count addresses rather than connections or events? Because a single Russian address produced nearly 14,800 events on October 11 — half of everything the honeypot recorded (51%) — and more than a third of the connections over the whole period. Counting events would have made Russia the top source of attacks; counting addresses puts it back in its place.
An important caveat: a sensor only sees what reaches it. The absence of Haiti is not proof that there is no malicious activity in the country, only that a sensor located elsewhere in the region does not see it. To know what really happens in the region, you have to observe from the inside.
What an organization can do this week
None of these measures needs a budget:
- Close SNMP to the internet, or restrict it to your monitoring addresses.
- Disable Telnet and move to SSH.
- Restrict TR-069 to the carrier's management server only.
- Never expose BGP or other routing protocols to the internet.
- Update embedded web servers, or take them off the internet if they cannot be updated.
- Check for yourself what your public addresses expose, with a public census tool like Shodan, before someone else does.
Where these numbers come from: Trogon Atlas
These observations come from Trogon Atlas, our cyber threat intelligence platform for Latin America and the Caribbean, currently in a pilot phase. Atlas gathers more than a dozen public sources and our own observations, then links and explains them in French and English. Its MVP, the first version for organizations in the region, is being prepared. This article is an example of what the platform already makes possible: turning scattered signals into findings that a manager can understand and act on.
Request early access to the Trogon Atlas pilot
Trogon Atlas tracks the cyber threats that affect Latin America and the Caribbean, in French and English. Pilot access is by invitation, for a small number of organizations. Two fields are enough: your name and email, and we will get back to you.